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Type 2 Political Corruption: 
Sources, Impacts, Solutions 
Abstract 
That Congress is corrupt is no secret. Polls show that it is held in very low esteem by the public. 
Why is that? The effectiveness of voter control of public policy in a system of representative 
government depends on compatibility of representative incentives with voter preferences. 
Many non-salient policy issues, among them both the details of complex legislation and most 
policies of administrative (regulatory) agencies, escape electoral discipline because voters ra-
tionally lack relevant preferences and information. Further, voters as consumers face barriers 
to effective collective action, such as diffuse interests and free rider problems. Consequently, 
consumer interest groups able to participate in effective lobbying and campaign financing do 
not form. Meanwhile, political agents (politicians) are forced by the electoral system to com-
pete for campaign resources, while effective interest groups have a demand for favorable 
treatment by administrative agencies. Many such agencies are controlled by Congressional 
committees rather than by the Executive and are accorded substantial deference by the judici-
ary. The result is what Lessig calls lawful and systemic “Type 2” political corruption, in which 
policies favorable to prevailing interest groups are supplied by committee chairs and other 
Members of Congress allied with compliant agencies. There is strong evidence that these poli-
cies generate welfare losses. They also contribute to occasional disasters such as the 1980s S&L 
Crisis and the 2008-2009 financial collapse.  
The absence of accountability in the administrative state is chiefly caused by the U.S. campaign 
finance system. Another root cause is the Supreme Court’s tacit amendment of the Constitution 
in Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), repealing the “implicit non-delegation doctrine.” 
This has permitting the creation of policy-making and adjudicatory agencies for whose perfor-
mance the president is not responsible and whose actions the judiciary typically reviews only 
for procedural lapses. Humphrey’s Executor and other judicial accommodations of the adminis-
trative state reflect the outcome of a struggle between Congress and the judiciary that is plau-
sibly modeled by positive political theorists. In this struggle the stake of the people was, and 
remains, unrepresented. No elected official or Article III judge is held responsible for the trans-
fers and welfare losses of the administrative state. 
Both types of political corruption redistribute income from consumers to shareholders, but 
Type 2, especially, also reduces aggregate welfare. They do so by impairing the creation and 
enforcement of regulatory policies that harmonize private incentives with welfare optimization. 
Both corrupt redistribution and impaired efficiency can reduce the stability and security of the 
state, but their adverse effect on stability and security is likely to be greater in an increasingly 2 
 
open or global economy. Falling transport and communication costs have increased producer, 
consumer and labor mobility, providing many economic interests with alternatives to continued 
participation in U.S. economic and political affairs. The danger is that even an extended period 
of economic decline and instability may not be sufficient to induce fundamental reforms. 
Solutions do not abound to the problem of Type 2 corruption and the resulting threat to the 
future security of the United States. Reform of the campaign finance system has proved to be 
difficult to reconcile with constitutional rights. Article III judges arguably should not be asked to 
make policy through substantive review of agency legislation. Revival of the defunct non-
delegation doctrine may be impractical. Other potential solutions seem improbable. Lessig has 
gone so far as to suggest as a remedy a constitutional convention under Article V. I propose 
what may be a more modest reform, a mechanism to identify and publicize the most serious 
instances of Type 2 corruption—those that lead to the largest welfare losses and that do the 
most harm to the poor.  
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Introduction 
Much scholarly discussion surrounds the many laws that regulate private economic and social 
activity. Some of these laws, especially those that impose criminal sanctions, fall into the en-
forcement jurisdictions of the attorney general or other cabinet officers. But most often these 
laws create specialized “agencies” either within the executive branch, such as the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) or 
in the constitutionally murky region between the executive and the legislature, such as the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
the United States Postal service. These agencies have enforcement responsibilities that include 
making the very laws the agencies enforce. Such laws are called rules or regulations. There is 
nothing neat about these categories. Congress enacts many statutes that are complex and par-
ticular, seeming to imply that Congress has a deep understanding of matters that might be re-
garded as the provinces of narrow expertise. Meanwhile, agencies enact many regulations that 
are sufficiently significant and sweeping to resemble legislation, but are nevertheless based on 
no greater expertise than any Member of Congress might be assumed to possess. It seems that 
the assignment of responsibility for law-making about economic regulation has to do with fac-
tors other than the need for subject-matter expertise. As it turns out, Congress delegates law-
making responsibility only to agencies it can trust.
1 Agencies more likely to respond to presi-
dential than to Congressional influence tend to operate under detailed statutes that circum-
scribe their discretion. 
Some political scientists explain the existence and jurisdictions of regulatory agencies as reflect-
ing the continuing strategic power struggle between Congress and the executive. Many admin-
istrative agencies are to a greater degree than cabinet departments outside the direct control 
of the president. The directors or commissioners of such agencies cannot, as a practical matter, 
be dismissed by the president or by a cabinet officer who reports to the president in a dispute 
about policy. This leaves the agency free of formal executive branch control. (The president 
may nevertheless exercise some informal control through appointments, the budget process 
and the political parties.) And of course Congress also exercises control of all agencies through 
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the operation of its powerful budget, appropriations and oversight committees. Again, there is 
not a sharp distinction between independent agencies and some executive branch agencies. 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), for example, although part of the cabinet Department 
of Health and Human Services, often acts more like an independent agency than like a cabinet 
department. The FDA and its Congressional committees pay close attention to each other. On 
the other hand, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is closely monitored by and respon-
sive to the White House.  
Government agencies that as a practical matter have the power both to legislate and to enforce 
law in the manner of courts present interesting and important constitutional issues. Certainly it 
is important to understand why they exist and how they affect economic welfare and the distri-
bution of wealth in our society, as compared with such theoretical alternatives as unregulated 
markets or consolidation of regulatory policy-making in the legislature and regulatory admin-
istration in the executive. Constitutional and administrative law scholars, along with political 
scientists, have long studied this issue. Much of the wider discussion reflects ideological con-
flicts between those who favor and those who oppose the rise of the administrative state. The 
discussion has a curious feature. It is a commonplace that those who associate themselves with 
business interests and unregulated markets have opposed the rise of the administrative state, 
while those inclined to populist or anti-business interests tend to support increased regulation. 
Yet it is primarily business interests that benefit from (at least) non-salient regulation, and con-
sumers who lose. In many cases of regulatory policy making, consumer interests are not even in 
the picture; the struggle is between opposing business interests.  
From an economic perspective, the ultimate test of government agency performance is its con-
tribution to economic welfare and equity.
2 There can be no question that unregulated markets 
suffer from numerous potential or actual failures for which government intervention could in 
                                                      
2 For purposes of this paper, I associate “welfare” with the idea of minimizing the cost of producing goods and ser-
vices, and selecting the quantities of goods and services so as to maximize (or at least increase) aggregate happi-
ness, as best we can measure it—traditionally, by assuming a correlation between economic value (willingness to 
pay) and happiness. I associate “equity” with the Rawlsian idea of adopting policies that (at a minimum) do not 
make the least happy citizens even worse off, and preferably making such citizens happier. However, I do not in-
clude Rawls’ egalitarian objective in the present definition of equity. John Rawls [cite] These usages are very rough 
and ready; a somewhat more detailed discussion appears below in connection with my “modest proposal.” 6 
 
principle provide effective remedies. But while this is a necessary part of the political rhetoric 
required to justify initial interventions, it is not sufficient as a matter of sound economic policy. 
Sufficiency logically requires at least that agency incentives are compatible with welfare and 
equity improvements, and that agencies designing or implementing interventions be at least as 
effective as imperfect markets. But these policy concerns with promoting the people’s welfare 
do not loom large in the power struggle between Congress and the president. Instead, Congress 
acts as if its primary motivation in establishing and overseeing regulatory agencies is to pro-
mote and protect the interest of its Members in a continuing flow of campaign contributions 
from interest groups. And, indeed, that is where Congressional incentives predictably lead.
3 
Organized and unorganized interests 
For present purposes an interest group is a collection of individuals with significant common 
goals capable of collective action affecting government policy. The “interest groups” of concern 
here are those to which government officials, legislators and even judges, along with other 
groups, must pay attention under penalty of serious costs to themselves or those persons and 
values about which they care. Interest groups have power if they can inflict such damage. Pow-
er arises from having alternatives. Put differently, interest groups are powerful when they can 
inflict damage on others at low cost to themselves. Most obviously, they can withdraw support 
from one elected official and support another instead. Or they can take measures to reduce 
their contributions to the coalition of interest groups supporting the current political equilibri-
um by exiting or partially exiting the coalition. Such political engagement typically requires or-
ganization and collective action.  
However, some interests can act “collectively” as individuals, without organizing, through the 
operation of markets. But such groups cannot participate in political debate or negotiation. For 
                                                      
3 Lawrence Lessig makes the same point at greater length in his book Republic, Lost: How 
Money Corrupts Congress—and a Plan to stop It, New York: Hachette, 2011. Lessig emphasizes 
the corrupting effects of individual wealthy donors on elected officials. This paper takes an eco-
nomic perspective on “agent” incentives and their compatibility, or not, with the promotion of 
public welfare and equity. I identify the insulation of the administrative state from political ac-
countability, in addition to the campaign finance system, as a principal source of corrupt poli-
cies. 7 
 
example, well-educated or skilled workers can migrate to jurisdictions with better services or 
lower taxes, decreasing output and tax receipts in their current places of residence.  The same 
is true of firms—some can move production and/or headquarters to more advantageous loca-
tions around the country or the globe. Markets and mobility give consumers, investors, workers 
and consumers some of the power of interest groups, but not the power to negotiate or to 
compromise. 
Similarly, individuals with shared passionate goals form natural “voting blocks,” or unorganized 
interests, on particular issues or candidates, even though they may lack any formal organization 
or leader, and in spite of an apparent free rider disincentive. Both voting and political participa-
tion by individuals are “irrational” because no individual vote or contribution is likely to change 
an outcome. But of course humans do behave irrationally in this sense all the time, because we 
derive pleasure (or relieve distress) by feeling connected to others, or because we form a pas-
sionate interest in some cause or candidate. Actions, such as voting, that require a modest sac-
rifice of time or convenience accordingly may “feel good” to us, and are irrational only to the 
extent that we mistake their longer term effects on happiness. Support of a cause or candidate 
becomes rational when it satisfies an emotional need, perhaps even if it is later regretted. 
Systemic biases in political representation 
In Republic, Lost, Lessig makes a distinction between two sorts of political corruption. The first 
and most obvious is bribery—where a politician is simply paid in cash or kind to produce some 
desired result. Such “Type 1” corruption is endemic in some cultures, and according to Lessig 
was commonplace in the United States in much of the 19
th century, but it appears to be rela-
tively rare in the U.S. today, at least at the federal level.
4  
Understanding the problem of Type 2 corruption requires taking a “principal-agent” perspec-
tive. Very often we, as principals, rely on others to make or to implement decisions on our be-
half. We may hire lawyers to explain the law and to make effective legal arguments for us. We 
may hire accountants to audit the businesses we own or may purchase, or simply to keep our 
books. We hire real estate agents to advise and assist in buying or selling property. In all of the-
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se cases we may assume that the agent will act in the same way we would act if we had the 
agent’s knowledge and expertise. We rely on the agent’s desire to protect her reputation and 
to follow the ethical codes of her profession. But this assumption is not reliable. Agents may 
very well act in their own interest, rather than ours, at least in some matters. For example, a 
real estate agent may advise us to accept a low bid in order to ensure her commission, rather 
than wait for a possible, but delayed and uncertain, higher bid. A lawyer may urge a client to 
accept a plea bargain in order to avoid what is for her the inconvenience and expense of a trial, 
even when the client has an excellent chance of winning. Reputation concerns may not be suffi-
cient to stem such behavior. In dealing with agents it is important for a principal to consider 
whether the compensation arrangements make the agent’s interest reasonably compatible 
with the goals of the principal. 
Elected political representatives are in the position of agents for their electoral constituents, 
actual and potential voters. They are likely to be less effective agents if their incentives are not 
compatible with the goals of their principals, the people. Elections in which incumbent repre-
sentatives are subject to periodic evaluation are the chief constraints on the actions of political 
agents.  
Understanding the incentives that politicians face is one way to understand the problem of 
Type 2 corruption. Clearly most Members of Congress resist the temptation to solicit or accept 
outright bribes; otherwise we would be more frequently bemused by stories of large quantities 
of cash found in home freezers.
5 In contrast, Type 2 corruption is perfectly consistent with poli-
ticians having the highest ethical or moral standards. Nevertheless, politicians are for the most 
part in the business of getting elected and then re-elected to the same or a higher office. Poli-
tics is a profession. As in any other professional calling, politicians want to be successful. They 
respond to the institutional incentives that lead to success, such as the need for well-funded re-
election campaigns and the absence of well-financed opponents.  
                                                      
5 “William J. Jefferson,” in Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_J._Jefferson, visited 
Jan 30, 2012. 9 
 
Type 2 corruption is systemic, and it is a very big problem in the United States. It is corruption 
because it distorts the incentives of politicians in ways that are harmful to the people they rep-
resent, and does so in ways and on issues that are mostly invisible to voters. It is not unlawful. 
Indeed, it arises because of our laws and legal institutions, and if remedies exist, they are to be 
found in reformation of law and legal institutions. Type 2 corruption is easily observable at the 
state and federal levels, and is directly responsible for much of what is wrong with government, 
including for example the recent crises in financial markets and the near bankruptcy of several 
states, such as California, where Type 2 corruption can be even more corrosive than in Wash-
ington, because state-level politics receives far less media coverage. I discuss some these ex-
amples below, and Lessig offers many more examples. 
Captured regulators, captured legislators, captured contributors 
The economics and political science literature devotes substantial attention to the behavior of 
regulatory agencies and their interactions with industries they regulate. The early economic 
models of administrative agencies assumed that regulatory agencies took seriously the “public 
interest” objectives of their statutory foundations.
6 Those models saw regulation chiefly as a 
battle about excess monopoly profits, in which agencies with less than adequate resources, in-
formation, and expertise struggled against utilities adept at hiding the ball and evading con-
straints. Subsequently, the literature turned to focus on interest groups (including but not lim-
ited to regulated firms) that succeed in “capturing” the regulatory agency by fostering close 
personal relationships between agency officials and lobbyists, by controlling information flow-
ing to the agency, and by hiring ex-regulators in order to induce current regulators to form ex-
pectations of future rewards for present favors.
7 In this account, collective action limitations 
                                                      
6 See, e.g., Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State, Transaction Publishers 1948. 
7 Ernesto Dal Bó, “Regulatory Capture: A Review,” OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY, vol. 22, no. 
2, 203-225; 2006; Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, “The Politics of Government Decision-
Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture,” QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS November, Vol. 106, 
No. 4, 1089-1127, 1991. 10 
 
prevent consumers from forming effective representative groups, permitting the agency to be 
captured by some combination of the better-represented interests.
8  
The day-to-day, issue-to-issue work of independent regulatory agencies is very largely con-
trolled by the cognizant Congressional committees and especially their chairs and minority 
leaders. Susan Snyder and Barry Weingast make the point quite directly: 
Although economists and political scientists approach the politics of regulatory agency 
policymaking in different ways, nearly all agree that, to a great extent, elected officials 
control regulatory agency policymaking for political ends. Elected officials negotiate the 
balance between citizen and interest group demand, translating this balance into pres-
sure on the agency. Scholars presume that agencies respond to political pressure, im-
plementing the goals of elected officials. An impressive body of scholarship supports 
these conclusions.
9  
Congressional committees are not aloof from the agencies in their jurisdictions. Members of 
Congress communicate frequently with the heads of agencies as well as senior agency officials 
both formally (in hearings and correspondence) and informally (in phone calls, meetings, and 
encounters at political or social events). Congressional committee staffs as well as Members’ 
personal staffs are in frequent communication with agency employees at all levels and rub 
shoulders at industry-sponsored and other events. Lobbyists and reporters scurry back and 
forth, carrying messages and gossip.  The trade press covers as much of the action as it can, 
some of it deliberately leaked. Although the law of administrative procedure restricts the timing 
and scope of communications and may require disclosure, there are effective “work-arounds.” 
If the agency is engaged in policymaking on an issue affecting an influential Member’s signifi-
cant supporters and campaign contributors, the Member’s views will be well-known to the 
agency decisionmakers, and are likely to be respected. Therefore, well-funded interests with a 
                                                      
8 Collective action theory describes the conditions necessary, and barriers to, effective political 
action by people with common interests. Phenomena such as “rational ignorance,” “diffuse in-
terests,” and “free rider problems” link individual incentives to group effectiveness. See Mancur 
Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press 1965 
9 Susan Snyder and Barry Weingast, “The American System of Shared Powers: The President, 
Congress, and the NLRB,” 16 JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION, AND MANAGEMENT, 269, n. 2, 
2000. Note that Snyder and Weingast challenge the quoted proposition. 11 
 
stake in the issue will certainly be contributors and supporters of key Members and build per-
sonal and social relationships with agency heads, agency staff, and corresponding denizens of 
Capitol Hill. 
Captured regulatory agencies, in short, reflect, to a significant extent, captured Congressional 
committee chairs and other legislative leaders. But “captive” has a misleading connotation. The 
legislators are not unwilling participants. On the contrary, they rely on regulated entities and 
their representatives for election campaign funding and related support.  
The political system as a whole is set up to favor policies that win elections, but most regulatory 
issues are insufficiently salient to have any direct effect on elections. Therefore, the system is 
biased in favor of policies that favor campaign donors and those who control grassroots elec-
tion machinery, such as passionate advocacy groups, unions and major local employers, and 
now perhaps online social media.
10  
There is seldom a serious principal-agent conflict between committees and independent agen-
cies like the FCC. Such agencies seldom buck their Congressional overlords. Agency heads try to 
avoid antagonistic and sometimes humiliating public hearings aimed at criticizing their perfor-
mance. They also try to avoid budget cuts and funding delays that disrupt agency operations 
and distract attention from urgent policy matters. Unless backed enthusiastically by the presi-
dent or under direct orders from the judiciary, very rare events, agencies are chiefly responsive 
to the wishes of their cognizant congressional committees. 
The creation and delegation of legislative, judicial and executive power to administrative agen-
cies began in the Progressive Era, more than a century ago. It required among other things sig-
nificant changes in judicial interpretation of the Constitution, and these changes were forth-
                                                      
10 Online media may prove to be a new nexus of political power. Members of interest groups 
can be cheaply identified and mobilized to participate in political activism. The Obama 2008 
primary campaign and the success of Wikipedia and other sites in organizing opposition to pro-
posed intellectual property rights legislation early in 2012 are suggestive examples. For a brief, 
cogent review and analysis, see Lee Drutman, “How SOPA and PIPA Did and Didn’t Change how 
Washington Lobbying Works,” http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2012/01/30/sopa-lobbyin/  12 
 
coming from the courts only grudgingly. The Supreme Court had to abandon the “non-
delegation” doctrine, said to be tacit in the Constitution, which held that the powers granted to 
the three branches of government by the Constitution were granted to those branches and to 
no one else. Previously, legislative and judicial powers were held to be exclusive and could not 
be delegated by Congress to administrative agencies—i.e., to the bureaucracy.
11 By the time of 
the New Deal, expansion of the administrative state seemed highly desirable as a political re-
sponse to voter preferences, neither Congress nor the judiciary thought it feasible to handle the 
increased workload in-house, and Congress was unwilling to give the Executive Branch full con-
trol of a bureaucracy empowered to, in effect, make law and decide cases. 
Inadequacy of the Constitutional framework 
The Constitution of the United States establishes the institutional groundwork for politics. 
Mountains of political science, legal, and historical analysis attempt to describe the Framers’ 
reasons and objectives in designing our constitutional institutions. But the Framers and those 
who ratified the Constitution did not speak with one voice, any more than voters do today, and 
the Constitution reflects compromises and contains deliberate ambiguities that arose from this 
diversity of viewpoints.
12 Nevertheless, it is clear that the Framers sought a democracy in which 
ultimate power was held by the people, exercised through elections of political representatives.  
The proper scope and role of the federal government was hotly debated in post-revolutionary 
America. The result by 1791 was to replace a failed initial solution (the Articles of Confedera-
tion) with our present Constitution, now much-amended both formally and informally (by ne-
glect of certain clauses and judicial reinterpretation of others), plus a Bill of Rights.
13 The rela-
tive power of the federal as opposed to the state governments was a primary dimension of dis-
                                                      
11 Cynthia R. Farina, Deconstructing Nondelegation, 33 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 
87-102 (year).  
12 See Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787-1788, (Simon & 
Schuster, 2010). 
13 The Constitution was debated and written in Philadelphia by a convention of state delegates 
in 1787 and ratified by the necessary nine states in 1788. The first ten amendments (the Bill of 
Rights) were ratified in 1791. 13 
 
pute. The memory of British colonial rule, associated with excessive and arbitrary centralized 
power, provided context for the debate. Various compromises led to the establishment of a 
federal government with limited jurisdictions versus both the states’ rights and the people’s 
liberties. The Constitution also constrained the federal government by an elaborate system 
called the “separation of powers,” designed to reduce the risk of the legislature or the execu-
tive engaging in tyrannical behavior. 
Constitutions work by articulating a structure for political decision-making and a default or 
starting distribution of rights among the people and their rulers. Obviously, something close to 
unanimity is required for a constitution initially to be an effective alternative to anarchy, and 
the need for near unanimity requires some imprecision or even internal contradictions in any 
constitution. Every actual or potential interest group must believe that, for itself, the constitu-
tional compromise is better than resort to isolation or rebellion. Changing technology, econom-
ic conditions, culture, and foreign affairs almost inevitably change the identities, power and 
composition of key interest groups over time, and to survive, the constitution of the state must 
also change to accommodate a changing equilibrium among the important groups.  
In order to reduce the threat of excessive federal power the Framers not only made all officials 
except judges subject to periodic elections, but imposed an elaborate system of “checks and 
balances,” designed in effect to hobble the potential of any individual part of the government 
to tyrannize the people, and in part to prevent even a unanimous government from acting in 
great haste. Finally, the functions of government at the federal level were tightly reined. The 
federal government was largely limited to activities, such as diplomacy, war, and regulation of 
interstate commerce, which could not be carried out efficiently by the individual states. 
From an economic perspective, the Constitution provides politicians with the incentive to re-
main popular with their electorates by pleasing a majority of voters. This is sometimes ex-
pressed as the need to satisfy the “median voter.”
14 How does a politician persuade a median 
                                                      
14 Of course, except perhaps in the case of referenda, the “median voter” is apocryphal. Most 
voters care about several issues in elections, and the median voter on one issue is unlikely to be 14 
 
voter? Ultimately, the politician must persuade the median voter that the politician’s interests 
are the same as the voter’s, at least on issues that matter most to the voter. The alignment of 
interests leads to voter expectation that there will be an alignment of preferred positions on 
specific legislation or other policy actions. The short-hand term for this alignment of interests is 
“incentive compatibility.”  
Voters are persuaded in many ways, but most often through family and friends who are “opin-
ion leaders,” by direct rhetorical appeal, by positive and negative advertising, by media cover-
age, and by less concrete factors such as candidate demeanor and personality. Effective use of 
these methods of persuasion require substantial expenditures, especially in contested elec-
tions. Contested campaigns are very expensive. Professional politicians can look forward to a 
career in which a substantial fraction of their time and energy will be spent raising funds, if only 
to reduce the likelihood of a challenge. This means approaching potential donors and asking for 
contributions. The most likely donors are representatives of interest groups to which the politi-
cian’s goodwill is especially important. For example, pharmaceutical companies are more likely 
to make campaign contributions to a senator or representative who sits on one of the commit-
tees that oversee the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) than to one who does not. This 
should not be surprising to anyone. Soliciting donations from the public at large generally is not 
a very cost-effective strategy. It is more efficient to seek donations from associations or organi-
zations that represent many individuals and thus absorb the costs of dealing with many differ-
ent donors.  Any organization, including even relatively small not-for-profit associations of indi-
vidual citizens with a common interest, can be an efficient source of campaign funding.
15  
                                                                                                                                                                           
the median voter on another. Politicians have to cobble together positions on multiple issues 
that aggregate more than 50% of the voters.  
15 The Supreme Court was widely and unjustly ridiculed for “deciding that corporations are peo-
ple,” in the notorious Citizens United case, 558 U.S. 08-205 (2010). Chief Justice Roberts ob-
served in his majority opinion that the term “corporation” applied to many thousands of small, 
not-for-profit benevolent organizations, and that outlawing independent political speech and 
political activity by such organizations clearly violated the First Amendment because it could 
not be distinguished from comparable activity by unincorporated groups of citizens.  15 
 
The Framers were not naïve about the ways of politics and politicians. They understood that 
interest groups (then called “factions”) could have tremendous power to influence elections 
and therefore policy. Supporters of the new Constitution, Federalists such as Jefferson, Hamil-
ton and Madison, took part in the state-by-state battles over ratification of the Constitution. 
They wrote a series of anonymous newspaper articles (signed by “Publius”) explaining and de-
fending the Constitution. These essays collectively are called The Federalist. One of the argu-
ments Madison made in one of the best-known of the Federalist Papers, No. 10, in favor of a 
strong federal government, as opposed to sole reliance on state governance, was that the geo-
graphically wider and larger federal constituency would help control the power of factions by 
playing them off against each other.  
Madison focused on one of the “problems of democracy”—the power of factions. Factions, for 
Madison, included not only special interests in the modern sense—well-organized minorities 
seeking advantage at the expense of the ill-organized majority—but also and especially pas-
sionate majorities seeking to disadvantage others, such as property interests or geographic or 
sectarian minorities. Thus, as Madison put it: “By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, 
whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by 
some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to 
the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”
16  
Madison argued that a large and diverse republic would tend to include specialized and conflict-
ing interests within the majority, which would discourage the dangerous exercise of the majori-
ty’s potential power. Specifically, the great danger of popular government from the perspective 
of the propertied class that wrote the Constitution was that the less-well-off majority would 
seek to expropriate the property of the well-off minority, precipitating class warfare, violence, 
and the destruction of the state.   
                                                      
16 James Madison [Publius], The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction 
and Insurrection (continued), 1787 (Federalist No. 10), New York: Heritage Press edition, 1945, 
54-62. 16 
 
The Framers’ argument may be read as focused on the usefulness of unfettered private enter-
prise and opportunities for self-betterment in diverting members of the majority away from a 
focus on redistribution and toward productive rivalry amongst themselves.
17  The major pur-
pose of Federalist No. 10 was to support a national representative republic, properly struc-
tured, as having a better shot at achieving successful and stable popular government than 
smaller (i.e., state or local) government, even with direct democracy.  
One element of Madison’s argument was the equation of individual material success, or at least 
its hope, with happiness, and the pursuit of happiness thus understood as a principal legitimate 
aim of government. The Founders did not deny the importance of aims higher than material 
well-being, but they saw those aims as belonging only to individuals or like-minded individuals 
convened in non-government organizations. Governments with nobler aims than material wel-
fare were seen as greater threats to liberty and individual freedom. This helps to explain, for 
example, the necessity to forbid establishment of religion. 
Much of Federalist No. 10 has now been made obsolete. The Founders’ vision of a limited gov-
ernment chiefly concerned with the promotion of material happiness hardly would be ap-
proved by many today, with materialism in disrepute. For many Americans this aspect of the 
Founders’ vision is an embarrassment. The Founders’ argument and assumptions in favor of 
this limited vision are not generally understood, and the theory’s empirical validity is open to 
question. Most everyone now has at least one passionate or deontological belief that “ought” 
to be read into the Constitution, if not already discernible therein. Government, far from being 
limited, according to the Supreme Court, “now wields vast power and touches almost every as-
pect of daily life.”
18  Still, history is not inconsistent with the success of the Founders’ design, at 
least prior to the events that ushered in the regulatory state—events such as the loss of legiti-
macy that free markets suffered in the Great Depression and the continuing revolution in in-
                                                      
17 Id. at 61-64. 
18 Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., ___ U.S. ___ (2011), slip 
op. at 18. 17 
 
formation collection and processing technology that permits greater bureaucratic control of 
economic and social activity.  
If we apply the Founders’ model to modern conditions, we see some new problems of democ-
racy, or rather, problems of a democratic regulatory state. But on the whole, the United States 
has resisted the particular threat that Madison and his colleagues feared—tyranny of a redis-
tributive majority that threatens to produce class warfare and violence. Other nations have 
gone much further along the redistribution route than the United States without instigating 
class warfare. Consider, for example, the comparative success and stability of democratic so-
cialism in Western Europe, which makes a much nearer approach to egalitarianism than does 
U.S. policy. It is clear that the United States has never approached the precipice in this respect. 
John Rawls, perhaps the most famous political and moral philosopher of the last century, 
brought a respect for supply-side realities into the liberal mainstream, and it seems likely to 
remain there as a safeguard against excessive egalitarianism.
19 
The Framers did not foresee the regulatory state. If they had, they might have predicted that 
two of the phenomena they feared would arise in a different way and on a different level than 
in the context of 1787. First, both the legislative and the administrative processes associated 
with regulation by administrative agencies are battlegrounds in which special interests vie to 
redistribute the gains from both private productive activity and any efficiency-enhancing inter-
ventions.  Second, as the Founders sensed and Mansur Olson formalized, the regulatory state is 
systematically biased against consumer and other interests that face collective action barriers 
to effective participation in the political process. Power in American society has been character-
ized by Andrew McFarland as “largely a matter of co-option of specific public-policy areas by 
elites, serving their own private interests.”
20  
                                                      
19 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Belknap Press, 2001). Rawls’ “difference 
principle” advocates equality up to the point that resulting supply-side disincentive effects re-
duce output and thus lower the welfare of the least well off. 
20 Andrew S. McFarland, “Interest Groups and Theories of Power in America,” BRITISH JOURNAL OF 
POLITICAL SCIENCE, 17, 130 (April 1987). 18 
 
A more fundamental problem with interest-group influence on regulatory outcomes is that 
there is no strong mechanism to limit outcomes to those that are welfare-enhancing. Although 
the game in which all (or a subset of) interest groups interact often is potentially positive-sum 
when externalities and other market failures are being addressed, there are numerous bargain-
ing, legal, and other constraints on the process. Interest groups may gain by focusing on their 
own shares even of a somewhat diminished pie, or they may simply be unaware of any adverse 
welfare effects of their success.  Indeed, in the context of complex technical, legal, and eco-
nomic regulations, there may be circumstances in which a group can gain only if the greater pie 
is incidentally diminished. So, in the regulatory state, not only are certain interests un- or un-
der-represented, but the cause of welfare enhancement is often orphaned.  This happens espe-
cially when the beneficiaries of a significant slice of the pie (i.e., consumers) are unable effec-
tively to defend themselves from expropriation. If the owners of every slice of the pie had ef-
fective defenses against expropriation, there would be more support for the pie’s expansion. 
The Framers were not surprised to see politicians from the southern states favoring free trade 
policies, because it was in the economic interest of the voters in those states, exporters of cot-
ton and tobacco and importers of British manufactured goods, to favor free trade. Similarly, 
northern politicians favored protectionism because their constituents produced manufactured 
goods that competed with those from Europe. What the Framers might have been very sur-
prised to see, however, was politicians favoring policies that caused economic harm to voters 
(or more generally, consumers) in their own states or districts. The Framers focused largely on 
factions defined by geography. They did not foresee the rise of factions defined by the jurisdic-
tions of Congressional oversight and budget committees. They also did not foresee the rise of 
the Administrative State or the creation of regulatory agencies with substantial regulatory au-
thority over particular industries or passionate interests. These developments changed the 
game.  
Underlying these and other specific policy issues is a basic political tenet of our representative 
government—the tacit assumption among legislators and regulators that only interests suffi-
ciently well-organized and wealthy to affect the outcome of an election are entitled to a place 19 
 
at the negotiating table. This assumption derives from the lack of political salience of regulatory 
policies and the mismatch between congressional districts and economic interest groups.  
Further, there is a tendency of regulatory intervention to have a ratchet effect, whereby those 
whom policy benefits form coalitions dedicated to the preservation and perhaps extension of 
the intervention.  In the absence of the original intervention, many such groups might never 
have organized. Some, perhaps many, interest groups exist only because government has cre-
ated the benefit they seek to retain and expand. The creation of such groups may be inadvert-
ent, an unanticipated consequence of steps taken toward another, perhaps entirely benign, 
policy objective. All of this is categorized by courts, reviewing regulatory doings, as political ac-
tivity beyond their ken, or if within it, adequately addressed by liberal standing rules. 
Whether or not an interest group was previously organized, each increment of new benefit 
from the extension of regulation will strengthen the group’s demand for continued interven-
tion. In some cases virtually every interest at the table has been created by past government 
actions, but the economic pie these interests sit down to divide belongs in part to a missing par-
ty: the people in their roles as consumers. The people have no effective voice in the bargaining 
because those who are elected to represent them, in practice, represent only those who can 
“pay to play.” Public opinion is important, of course, but it lacks a voice proportionate to voters’ 
collective stake or their potential but unorganized power. Also, public opinion itself is respon-
sive to the effective expenditure of interest-group resources.  
Responsiveness in a democracy is by no means regrettable, of course. No one favors a govern-
ment unresponsive to the welfare of those it represents. The problem lies not in responsiveness 
to organized interests but in lack of responsiveness to un- or ill-organized interests such as con-
sumers. To be sure, legislators and other officials are admired if they rise above their self-
interest in re-election or future employment opportunities in order to serve those who are un-
der-represented, weak, poor, disadvantaged or unpopular. Yet there is faint applause indeed 
for the politician who defends the ordinary consumer from welfare-reducing regulations.  
Statesmanship or courage in public officials was long seen as evidence of good character and 
honorable behavior, and was the norm of civic expectations for elected officials. But the ideals 20 
 
expressed by James Stewart’s character in the movie “Mr. Smith Goes to Washington” may 
never have been realized in practice, and today that view is unfashionable and naïve. Modern 
public expectations of political behavior are much reduced. Congress is held in disrepute by a 
large majority of the public, and trusted by few.
21 To behave in one’s self-interest, after all, is 
“rational,” the norm of nearly every economic model. Within the bounds of law self-interested 
behavior is taken for granted. The modern administrative state is no more immune to interest 
group politics than any other form of government. Indeed, as suggested above, it is a core fea-
ture of that state. 
The PPT account of administrative agencies 
A branch of political science approaches the study of politics using positive political theory 
(PPT), corresponding to economists’ rational actor models of decision-making behavior.
22 In 
essence, political actors are assumed to pursue their goals strategically, taking account of each 
other’s expected reactions, in a series of interdependent sequential decisions.
 23  
                                                      
21 Approval ratings for Congress ran as low as 9% in 2011. See New York Times/CBS News/ Rop-
er polling data, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/10/12/politics/main3362530.shtml  
22 See David Austen-Smith, Economic Methods in Positive Political Theory, Oxford Handbook of 
Political Economy (Wittman and Weingast, eds.) pp. 899-914 (2008), and McNollGast, The Polit-
ical Economy of Law, in M. Polinsky and S. Shavell, eds, Handbook of Law and Economics, Vol-
ume 2, (Amsterdam, Elsevier B.V., 2007) 1651-1738. 
23 “PPT of Law uses sequential game theory as its core analogy, but in PPT the process has four 
stages. … In the first stage, citizens vote for candidates. In the second stage, elected officials 
(legislators and, where relevant, independent executives) produce law that empowers bureau-
crats. In the third stage, a bureaucratic official makes decisions to elaborate and to enforce the 
law as authorized by statutes or decrees (e.g., Executive Orders). In the fourth stage judges 
make decisions on the basis of their own preferences, subject to the constraints and incentives 
that are established by pre-existing law (judicial precedent, statutes, the Constitution). In each 
stage, decisions reflect “rational expectations” in that choices are based on expectations of the 
future behavior of decision-makers in subsequent stages. Because the four-stage game is re-
peated, in the fourth stage courts make decisions in expectation that all other actors will have a 
chance to respond to them.”   McNollGast, The Political Economy of Law, in M. Polinsky and S. 
Shavell, eds, Handbook of Law and Economics, Volume 2, (Amsterdam, Elsevier B.V., 2007) at 
1662 (footnotes omitted). 21 
 
PPT provides a useful framework for understanding the dynamics of intra-branch and other po-
litical disputes and power struggles. So far, however, it has not addressed the roots of Type 2 
political corruption. The essence of Type 2 corruption is the absence of a political check on 
Congressional pursuit of electoral advantage, rooted in (1) voter indifference to most regulatory 
policy issues and (2) lack of voter sympathy for business in general and free markets in particu-
lar. In this context, Congress’ historical success in wresting control of the bureaucracy from the 
president, the judicial retreat from substantive due process, and the relative lack of party disci-
pline in both Houses, have left nothing to constrain legislators from responding to the incen-
tives they face to make deals at odds with the overall efficiency of the economy and the partic-
ular interests of consumers.  
In circumstances where the resulting strategic game has an equilibrium (a set of strategic 
choices such that no actor, knowing the strategies of other actors, wants to change her strate-
gy),
24 these models seek to make what are, in principle, testable predictions about political be-
havior. Use of PTP is contentious in political science, where it is contrasted with traditional ver-
bal descriptions (histories) of motivation and behavior, based on such factors as the personali-
ties and experiences of political leaders, that seek to explain observed outcomes.
25 PTP aspires 
to greater rigor by emphasizing the observation-theorizing-hypothesis-empirical testing para-
digm of positivist philosophy, or what is generally referred to as the “scientific method.” The 
primary impact of PTP in political science has been to emphasize the interdependence of politi-
cal actors and the usefulness of explanations involving strategic interaction in making sense of 
                                                      
24 This describes a Nash equilibrium. Other types of equilibria and many types of disequilibria 
are possible. In the absence of equilibria, PPT has no basis for predictions of behavior. 
25 As with the assumption of Nash equilibrium, there is ample room for disputes about the 
meaning and existence of “rationality” and other basic assumptions of PPT. See James Johnson, 
What Rationality Assumption? Or, How ‘Positive Political Theory’ Rests on a Mistake, POLITICAL 
STUDIES, VOL 58, 282–299 (2010). 22 
 
political outcomes. As it happens, PTP scholars have explored administrative agencies and law 
in depth.
26  
By way of background to the PPT “take” on the administrative state, following Rodriguez and 
Weingast, it is useful to consider three modern watersheds in the growth of regulation: the 
Progressive Era, the Great Depression-New Deal Era, and what I will call the Inflationary Era of 
social and economic regulation that began in the 1960s.
27  
Federal regulation of business emerged in the Progressive (or Populist) Era that began in the 
last quarter of the 19
th century. Prior to that time, the federal government was chiefly con-
cerned to promote trade and commerce among the states, as the Framers intended. Federal 
                                                      
26 Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, (writing under the acronym 
“McNollgast,”) have been major contributors to the PPT literature. Examples include “Political 
Control of the Bureaucracy,” in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law. (Lon-
don: Palgrave, 1999); “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control,” 3 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); “Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrange-
ments and the Political Control of Agencies,” 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989); “The Political Economy 
of Law,” in M. Polinsky and S. Shavell, eds, Handbook of Law and Economics, Volume 2, (Else-
vier B.V., 2007); “Slack, Public Interest, and Structure-Induced Policy,” JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOM-
ICS, & ORGANIZATION, Vol. 6, (1990), pp. 203-212; “Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political 
Theory in Statutory Interpretation,” LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, Vol. 57, No. 1, (Winter, 
1994), pp. 3-37; “Positive and Normative Models of Procedural Rights: An Integrative Approach 
to Administrative Procedures,” JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS, & ORGANIZATION, Vol. 6, (1990), pp. 
307-332; “The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act,” JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS, 
& ORGANIZATION, Vol. 15, No. 1, (1999), pp. 180-217. 
27 The metaphor refers to the inflation of the universe thought by cosmologists to have oc-
curred between about 10
−36 and 10
−33 seconds after the hypothesized Big Bang. The growth of 
the administrative state is commonly quantified by counting the number of pages of new regu-
lations published annually in the FEDERAL REGISTER.  Rodriguez and Weingast refer to this third 
watershed era as the “Great American Political Transformation.” 
1960  14,479 
1970  20,036 
1980  87,012 
1990  53,620 
2000  83,294 
2010  82,590 
“Federal Register Pages Published Annually,” 
http://www.llsdc.org/attachments/wysiwyg/544/fed-reg-pages.pdf  23 
 
support to stimulate at first canal and road and then railroad construction and the development 
of the American West were the culmination of the promotional era.
28 The federal courts, 
throughout most of this period, resisted efforts by the states to constrain business market 
power, again reflecting the Framers’ emphasis on protecting property rights from democratic 
(majority) excesses.  
The Progressive Era was energized by agrarian political forces such as the Grangers, by the 
growth and consolidation of trade unions such as the Knights of Labor and the American Feder-
ation of Labor, by other populist movements, and by muckraking journalists promoted by an 
emergent advertiser-supported mass media. Agitation by farmers led to the passage of the Act 
to Regulate Commerce (1887), which created the railroad-regulating Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC), aimed at protecting short-haul shippers such as farmers from price discrimi-
nation.
29 The Supreme Court backed away from constitutional bans on monopoly price regula-
tion in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877), but insisted that the courts have the last word on the 
substantive “due process” issues involved in the determination of rates,
30 an example of the 
strategic interaction of Congress and the judiciary. The Sherman Antitrust Act was signed in 
1890. Ida Tarbell and others drew attention to abuses by the great trusts. Her book, The History 
of the Standard Oil Company (1904), was one of the first major exercises in investigative jour-
nalism. The disintegration of the Standard Oil Trust, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), the Tobacco Trust, 221 
U.S. 106 (1911), and others were early victories of federal antitrust enforcement.  Upton Sin-
clair wrote The Jungle in 1906, exposing unsanitary conditions at slaughterhouses, and contrib-
uted to the enactment of the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906.  
                                                      
28 Richard J. Orsi, Sunset Limited: The Southern Pacific Railroad and the Development of the 
American West, 1850-1930 (Berkeley: Univ. California Press, 2007); Lloyd J. Mercer, Railroads 
and Land Grant Policy: A Study in Government Intervention (Beard Books, 1982). 
29 This explanation of the creation of the ICC was challenged by Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and 
Regulation, 1877-1905 (Norton, 1965). Kolko argued that the Act to Regulate Commerce was 
chiefly motivated by the railroads’ own demand for reduced inter-railroad competition. 
30 Smyth v. Ames 171 U.S. 361 (1898).  24 
 
The Progressive Era faded after World War I.  But the Great Depression later brought enormous 
discredit to the political legitimacy of business and property interests, first with the public and 
the Roosevelt administration and eventually with the judiciary. Congress populated the result-
ing vacuum with new administrative agencies that had both regulatory and promotional (re-
covery) mandates. The Supreme Court permitted Congress to award “independent” legislative, 
judicial, and executive powers to these new agencies in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 
295 U.S. 602 (1935), subject to appellate review by the judiciary, a pattern mirroring the com-
promise of Smyth v. Ames. Smyth introduced substantive judicial review of agency rate making 
as the price of permitting agencies to set rates; the Court invented the fiction that rates could 
be set below monopoly levels without triggering a taking, so long as a judge approved the re-
sult. But in the Depression period the Court retreated steadily from substantive review of agen-
cy policy, starting with such New Deal precedents as Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) 
(permitting state regulation of the price of ice) and its subsequent repudiation of Smyth in FPC 
v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591 (1944) (abandoning substantive review of agency rate making 
proceedings.)   
Both the Progressive Era and the New Deal consisted in part of power struggles between Con-
gress, the courts and the presidency, as well as other actors, such as the states, against a back-
ground of changing public opinion, economic conditions, and technology. The administrative 
state emerged from these struggles with large sectors of the bureaucracy largely independent 
of the presidency. Some presidents may have welcomed this political insulation, at least for 
some agencies and some issues. Dominance by Congress then faced challenge only from the 
judiciary. But Hope presaged a steady retreat by the courts, not only from substantive review of 
regulatory policies, but even from full sovereignty over statutory interpretation, retaining for 
practical purposes only the power to review agency decision-making procedures. In return, 
Congress offered up the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), codifying various process rights 
and procedures binding the bureaucracy (and protecting the interest groups benefiting from 
the status quo).  25 
 
Rodriguez and Weingast explore the most recent of three watershed periods in the develop-
ment of the administrative state.
31 The story is chiefly concerned with the Inflationary Era and 
seeks to explain the evolving status of administrative law as the outcome of strategic interac-
tions between Congress and the courts. The Inflationary Era began in a time of widespread civil 
unrest, including early protests against the Vietnam War and the peak years of the civil rights 
movement, and continued into the 1970s with the environmental movement, and lesser con-
sumer and worker safety movements.
32 The period included interventions growing out of 
landmark civil rights legislation regulating the hiring and service behavior of business as well as 
solutions to the problems of racial discrimination in voting, education, and other areas. Inter-
ventions continued in the 1970s with sweeping economy-wide legislation aimed at air and wa-
ter pollution, along with other environmental externalities. Antidiscrimination laws have since 
been extended to new categories of disfavored persons, such as the disabled. New areas of 
economic regulation were generally consistent with the idea that intervention should be re-
sponsive to market failures, but were often framed in anti-business terms. Similarly, social regu-
lation, such as antidiscrimination laws, while less often framed as anti-business, had the effect 
of imposing new costs on business.
33 
                                                      
31 Daniel B. Rodriguez and Barry R. Weingast, “A Positive Political Theory of the Reformation of 
Administrative Law,” working paper University of Texas School of Law Faculty Colloquium (Au-
gust 2011). http://www.utexas.edu/law/colloquium/papers-public/2011-2012/10-11-
11_rodgast.adminlaw.1011.docx  
32 Two early examples, are George Hilton, “The Basic Behavior of Regulatory Commissions,” THE 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Vol. 62, No. 1/2 (Mar. 1, 1972), pp. 47-54, and Robert Bork, The Anti-
trust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, (Basic Books 1978). 
33 This is not intended to imply that such regulation necessarily reduces welfare, because it 
does not. However, the amount and incidence of costs associated with such interventions are 
not much considered, when rationality would counsel otherwise. Perhaps the most extreme 
example is the 1973 Endangered Species Act, which on its face protected endangered species 
and their natural habitats without regard to cost. “[I]t is clear from the Act’s legislative history 
that Congress intended to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction-whatever the 
cost.” Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 184 (1978). Subsequent amendments have 
permitted only a very marginal role for consideration of costs and benefits. Gardner M. Brown 26 
 
Contradictorily, the Inflation Era was also a period in which many of the older New Deal agen-
cies fell into disrepute, based on the increasing popularity in the academy of welfarism and the 
sharp contrast between welfarist principles and agency behavior aimed at fairness norms and 
the suppression of “unfair competition.”
34 By about 1980 most transportation industries had 
been deregulated, along with large and growing areas of banking and finance. Even the Federal 
Communications Commission underwent a period of regulatory reform.  
The APA gave the judiciary a focus and a boundary for its retreat to procedural review, which, 
during the Inflationary Era, was used to expand standing rules to encompass new interests, 
such as consumer, health and environmental activists. As Rodriguez and Weingast point out, 
these social regulation interest groups grew in political power in the 1960s and later, they 
adopted a role similar to that of the producer interests in “capturing” agencies and were cap-
tured by entrepreneurial Members of Congress, who stepped forward to champion their caus-
es, earning campaign and other support. In the areas of environmental and atomic energy regu-
lation the new activists were able, thanks to these political bargains, to outmaneuver the busi-
ness interests that had formerly dominated policy-making legislative committees and agencies.  
From a policy perspective, nothing could better illustrate the distinction between procedural 
and substantive review than the courts’ failure to recognize that activist groups given standing, 
just as with the industry groups they opposed, generally lacked incentives consistent wholly 
with the welfare of the people as consumers. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, for ex-
ample, imposed design standards on utility power sources with the intent and effect of pre-
venting the substitution of cheap low-sulfur western coal for high-sulfur eastern coal. This fa-
vored the dominant western environmentalists at the expense of exposing eastern populations 
both to higher levels of air pollution and higher energy costs. Similarly, environmentalists suc-
                                                                                                                                                                           
Jr. and Jason F. Shogren, “Economics of the Endangered Species Act,” JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PER-
SPECTIVES, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer, 1998), pp. 3-20. 
34 Welfarism refers to the notion that policy should seek to satisfy weak, so-called Kaldor-Hicks, 
versions of Pareto efficiency (seeking to increase aggregate net welfare without immediate re-
gard to distributive concerns), with a rebuttable presumption favoring competitive markets ra-
ther than regulation as a means to that end.  27 
 
ceeded in reversing the national policy of promoting nuclear power production, at the expense 
of public health, in order to mitigate an irrational environmentalist fear of nuclear energy.
35  
The landmarks of judicial retreat after the APA include two Supreme Court cases handed down 
in 1983 and 1984. The first, State Farm, adopted the so-called “hard look” standard of appellate 
review of agency action, which brought the logic of administrative decisions within the purview 
of judicial procedural review.
36 The “hard look” doctrine focuses on the path taken by the agen-
cy in the journey from “facts” to policies, given statutory goals. It asks only whether the path is 
internally “rational,” not whether there might be facts or alternatives not considered for lack of 
effective representation of certain interest groups. As noted, the Court treats easy access to 
standing as if it were sufficient to assure effective representation of all interests. The second 
case, Chevron, conceded to administrative agencies the right to judicial deference in interpret-
ing their own statutes.
37 Chevron actually overrode the part of Marbury v. Madison, which held 
that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of [the judicial branch] to say what the law is.”
38   
Welfare effects of Type 2 corruption  
There is a great deal of literature examining the often adverse effects of regulation on consum-
er welfare, and overlapping literature associating regulatory policy with congressional and spe-
cial interest influence. Lessig’s Republic, Lost contains numerous examples, and publications 
such as Regulation magazine specialize in this topic.
39 There is a variety of organizations that 
collects and publishes online data pertaining to Type 2 corruption issues, including for example 
OpenSecrets.org, POGO Project on Government Oversight, and the Sunlight Foundation.  
                                                      
35 [Need cites] 
36 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 
463 U.S. 27 (1983). 
37 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
38 5 U.S. 137 (1803) at 177–78. Marbury v. Madison marked the Supreme Court’s seizure of the 
right to determine the constitutional status of laws. 
39 [citations to survey articles – Whinston JEL?] 28 
 
Transportation. As regulatory institutions age, stories of Type 2 corruption tend to become 
clearer. Kolko’s revisionist history of the Interstate Commerce Commission, cited earlier, is an 
example. Even if Kolko is wrong about “the” purpose of the Act to Regulate Commerce, he cer-
tainly is correct that the ICC did everything it could over many decades to reduce both railroad 
and inter-modal price competition, and ended up encouraging elaborate systems of price dis-
crimination. This obviously is not what the Grangers had in mind. It is widely accepted that ICC 
(and later Civil Aeronautics Board) regulation significantly reduced the economic efficiency of 
transportation services in the U.S., to the disadvantage of consumers. Encouragingly, both 
agencies eventually were abolished on precisely those grounds. It may not be coincidental that 
both agencies distorted but could not eliminate competition, so that industry profits were low 
in spite of the interventions. Abolition of the agencies may have been facilitated by industry 
recognition that regulation no longer served their interests. 
Foreign Trade. Probably the oldest and simplest stories of interest group success in diverting 
Congressional incentives away from consumer interests come from trade policy. The point of 
trade barriers (tariffs and quotas) is to enhance the profits of domestic manufacturers at the 
expense of domestic consumers, by depriving consumers of competitive alternatives. Trade pol-
icy, however, has long been prominent in political debate and political campaigns. In that re-
spect trade policy, like other high-salience political debates, has differed from the regulatory 
institutions of the administrative state that remain insulated from political accountability.
40  
Broadcasting. Federal nationalization of the electromagnetic spectrum occurred in 1927, en-
couraged by then-Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover. Since that time, the spectrum has been 
allocated by the Federal Communications Commission together with an inter-agency commit-
tee that deals with government spectrum uses. Whatever may have been the case in 1927, 
most economists agree that the spectrum could be allocated by private markets, provided that 
adequately defined property rights were first allocated to private owners, by auction or other 
means. In making spectrum allocation decisions the FCC has been heavily influenced by industry 
                                                      
40 [Insert discussion of politics of fast track trade negotiation authority. See Levent Celik, Bilgeh-
an Karabay, John McLaren, “When is it Optimal to Delegate: The Theory of Fast-track Authori-
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interests, both directly and through congressional patrons. For example, the FCC for decades 
made first radio and then TV licenses artificially scarce in order to protect the economic inter-
ests of networks and big-city stations. This resulted in massive losses of consumer welfare, both 
in programming that was never produced or viewed and in the costly construction of cable tel-
evision, and later satellite television, facilities by the private sector to mitigate the continuing 
unmet consumer demand. No one has quantified the welfare loss, but the construction cost of 
unnecessary cable and satellite facilities alone ran to many tens of billions, taking no account of 
the lost willingness to pay for additional video content over many decades. 
Banking and Finance. Regulation of financial services appears to have been largely responsible 
for the two great financial crises of the post-World War II period. In the period around 1980, 
rising interest rates threatened the solvency of Savings & Loan (“S&L”) institutions. Congress 
directed regulators to treat S&Ls institutions as solvent, rather than close them at the expense 
of their owners, even if the market value of their liabilities exceeded the market value of their 
assets, so long as the nominal or “book” value of net worth was positive. The investment incen-
tives of S&L managers were created by real (market) values, not accounting fictions such as 
book value. With nothing to lose, hundreds of S&Ls began to invest in extremely risky assets, 
knowing that any losses would be the responsibility of taxpayers, while rare good luck would 
benefit owners. In the end, taxpayers had to pay out hundreds of billions of dollars to protect 
depositors from the consequences of congressional and regulatory capture by S&L sharehold-
er/campaign contributors.
41  
Housing finance. The financial crisis of 2008, although not yet fully assessed by economic histo-
rians, also appears to have been caused in part by political contributor-motivated congressional 
and regulatory policies, in several ways. The immediate cause was a failure of regulators to con-
sider, assess, and limit the exposure of key financial institutions to systemic risk and specifically 
to the risks associated with a housing market bubble. Even if systemic risks were too difficult for 
regulators to assess, it is clear that regulators could and should have understood the risks asso-
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ciated with the housing-based derivatives and sub-prime assets on individual bank balance 
sheets. Equally, it was construction and related housing industry campaign contributions that 
encouraged congressional pressure on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to securitize, and thus 
promote, subprime mortgage lending. Far from tending to mitigate market failures associated 
with cognitive errors in consumer risk assessment and information, Type 2 corruption in federal 
housing policy made the problem worse. 
Financial Crises. The movement to deregulate financial institutions starting in the 1970s was 
originally motivated by anti-competitive regulations such as the ban on inter-state banking, the 
Fed’s Regulation Q, the fixing of commission rates, and the gerrymandering of competitive 
boundaries between different categories of banks. Eventually, however, deregulation became 
an end in itself. Both Congress and regulators ignored the presence of factors, akin to those 
that caused the S&L crisis, that made the incentives of financial corporations inconsistent with 
welfare optimization. The 2008 crisis appears to have involved principal/agent conflicts be-
tween corporate management and both customers and shareholders. Correcting such misa-
ligned incentives requires changes in law or regulation, not deregulation. Making matters worse 
was the proliferation of financial regulatory agencies, each with a confined jurisdiction designed 
to accommodate new congressional oversight and budget committees and thus new opportuni-
ties for industry interests and Members of Congress to exchange contributions for influence. As 
the 2008 crisis unfolded, the first thoughts of many regulators and legislators likely turned to 
finding ways to protect financial firms, not taxpayers or investors. 
Type 2 corruption threatens political stability and national security  
The judicial branch of the government in America seized an early opportunity to designate itself 
as the final arbiter of what actions, statutes and procedures were consistent with the Constitu-
tion and thus lawful.
42 This power grab was tacitly accepted as part of the constitutional com-
promise, perhaps because key interest groups saw advantages in having a conservative body 
(i.e., a supreme court constrained by the tradition of respect for stare decisis) in charge of con-
stitutional interpretation. This would tend to preserve the privileges accorded to such groups in 
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the face of challenges from future rivals. Nevertheless, the Constitution does change over time, 
as it must to remain a foundation for a viable government in a changing world. Jefferson 
thought the Constitution should be rewritten or renewed every generation.
43 That the Constitu-
tion changes (or is understood to mean something other than what it says or doesn’t say) is no 
guarantee that the nature and structure of government will remain viable, however. 
Change is not a linear process. Adaptations of governments (and constitutions) to changing 
conditions can take various forms and follow multiple subsequent paths. In general, the path of 
change in the past constrains the range and timing of alternatives available in the future. This is 
called “path dependence.” It is possible for a government (and a constitution) to take a path 
that, while initially highly adaptive, results eventually in structure that is no longer viable—that 
is, a path on which one or more interest groups have more to gain from abandoning the coali-
tion than from remaining. At such a point either the constitution must be renegotiated or the 
state may collapse.  
As discussed above, a condition for a viable constitutional coalition is that each included group 
with the alternative not to join views joining (under the proposed conditions or constitutional 
terms) as preferable to not joining, assuming that all other included groups meet the same 
condition. In this sort of equilibrium, every group is doing the best it can while assuming that 
every other group is doing the same, so no group has any reason to change strategies. Obvious-
ly, the existence and structure of any equilibrium depends on the nature of the internal ar-
rangements of the coalition as well as the values and risks of alternatives available to those 
groups. As the state, considered as a political coalition of its interest groups, moves through 
time, any number of exogenous influences, such as changing economic conditions, foreign en-
tanglements, or new technologies, threaten to undo the equilibrium. Of these influences, some 
can be countered by internal re-arrangements, but others not. If no internal adjustment can be 
made, one or more groups may depart the coalition, possibly triggering further changes. A 
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range of final outcomes is possible, including, obviously, the absence of any ensuing equilibri-
um, implying a descent into political instability. 
These two sources of non-viability for a state and its constitution (that is, internal path depend-
ence that ends badly and disruptive external exigencies) are held in check by the substantial 
costs and risks associated with collapse of the state. A coalition member whose departure 
would render the state non-viable must anticipate a period of chaos and anarchy potentially 
harmful to itself. The gains from departure must be quite large to offset these costs and risks. 
On the other hand, such a group constitutes a great threat to the remaining groups. In contrast, 
a departure that would not lead to the demise of the state (because the remaining groups 
would comprise a smaller but still viable coalition) has a higher opportunity cost of remaining in 
the coalition, but constitutes less of a threat to the remaining members.  
Because every group with the power (on account of an attractive alternative) to leave a coali-
tion compares its prospective gains from continued participation with its expected gains from 
the external opportunity, state viability is a comparative matter. A state is more likely to remain 
viable if the gains it produces in the aggregate are expected to be greater, or growing faster, 
than gains expected to be available externally. Given the aggregate gains expected to be availa-
ble internally, the remaining variable is how the gains are divided among the interest groups 
that comprise the coalition. An interest group focuses not on aggregate gains alone (though 
that affects the viability of the coalition as a whole) but also on its share of those gains. Thus, a 
government seeking to remain viable must concern itself both with making the most productive 
use of available resources, including investment in growth, and also with the distribution of val-
ue among the various interest groups.  
The systemic neglect of consumer economic, not to mention environmental, health and other 
interests, by an administrative state corrupted by Type 2 influences must ultimately threaten 
the stability and survival of the United States. Markets and new technologies provide interest 
groups with attractive alternatives. Type 2 corruption transfers welfare from politically ineffec-
tive consumer interests to politically effective producer and passionate interests. Simultaneous-
ly, regulatory intervention tends to reduce productive efficiency and therefore aggregate wel-33 
 
fare. In response, ineffectively organized economic interests will simply seek to leave if market 
conditions permit.  Changing technologies, especially falling communication costs, and global 
markets now make it much easier for market forces to act as if consumers were effectively or-
ganized for collective action. The costs imposed on productive economic activity and ultimately 
on consumers and taxpayers by the administrative state make relocation of consumption, in-
vestment and production to competing states increasingly desirable. Yet in spite of their grow-
ing ability to exercise power by departing from the coalition supporting our current political 
system, politically ineffective interest groups have no lobbyists and can engage in no negotia-
tions. Preservation of our current system will require that an accountable political actor speak 
and act for these interests.  
What can be done about Type 2 corruption and its consequences? 
Proposed solutions to the capture problem take several forms. One is greater oversight by the 
courts.
44 As indicated above, however, the judicial branch has essentially abandoned the field 
by limiting itself to formal process reviews of agency decisions. Still, the Court has left numer-
ous loopholes through which it might reassert itself. For example, it could decide to include col-
lective action pathologies within the scope of “hard look” rationality. That is, it could recognize 
that neither standing nor the petition clause of the First Amendment alone are sufficient solu-
tion to the problem of effective interest group participation, either before the bureaucracy or 
before the legislature.  
Another approach to the Type 2 corruption problem, akin to Madison’s solution to the problem 
of controlling majority passions, discussed above, is an aggregation of agency jurisdictions, 
seeking to eliminate highly specialized agencies such as the FCC in favor of regulators with 
broad jurisdiction such as the antitrust agencies. This could reduce the number of highly spe-
cialized congressional committees and diffuse the power of special interest groups to purchase 
favorable regulations in return for campaign contributions in cash or kind.  
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“High politics”—periodic interventions by the president or other political leaders to reform reg-
ulation—is another potential solution. High politics is said to produce cycles of political reform 
or at least periodic high-salience that only briefly interrupt “business as usual” at the captured 
agency.
45 Of course, high politics is the natural forum for debate on salient political issues such 
as war, abortion rights, tax reform, the national budget and other headline news issues where 
Type 2 corruption is not as common. 
None of these solutions seems very promising, simply because they leave problems of incen-
tive-compatibility unaddressed. Modeling the relationship between Congress and agencies in a 
principal-agent framework assumes, naively, that Congress (or, more realistically, relevant 
committees and committee chairs) seeks to advance the public good. Except in times of “high 
politics,” typically involving the president, legislators have very little incentive to advance the 
public good at the expense of potential campaign contributions and other interest group favors. 
Indeed, legislators are even more likely to be captured than the heads of regulatory agencies, 
simply because they, unlike regulators, can lawfully accept cash contributions.  
The fact is that Congressional committees and the regulatory bodies they oversee often do not 
have seriously incompatible incentives. In communications policy, for example, key legislators 
often successfully pressure regulators to adopt policies favoring important contributors or polit-
ically powerful groups such as the National Association of Broadcasters. If pressure does not 
work, the threat of legislation often can solve the problem. In general, independent regulatory 
agencies such as the FCC are in fear of and eager to please the oversight and budget commit-
tees to which they are responsible.  
Leaving aside far-reaching and unlikely constitutional changes affecting campaign contributions 
or the scope of government, the only remedies would seem to be empowering underrepre-
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sented interests or insulating regulatory policy from the political process.
46 Neither of these ap-
proaches is appealing.  
Empowering citizen or consumer interests is unappealing because those who purport to speak 
for such groups have a poor track record in identifying important sources of welfare loss and 
because they reflexively favor more or more intrusive regulation and less reliance on market 
solutions, while ignoring the imperfections of regulation. But it is regulation that keeps such 
advocates in business, by providing a legitimizing forum. For the most part these consumer ac-
tivist groups are self-nominated and not accountable to their own purported constituencies, 
creating principal-agent problems akin to those facing Congress.  
Insulating regulation from the political process throws the baby out with the bath water. The 
point of “independent” administrative agencies is to insulate quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial 
regulatory bodies from the exercise of executive power while preserving accountability to those 
branches whose power has been delegated—the legislature and the judiciary. To untether 
agencies from Congress and the Executive, and to accord them judicial deference, opens the 
door to bureaucratic tyranny. As Madison put it in Federalist No. 47, “The accumulation of all 
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, 
and whether hereditary, self-appointed or elective, may justly be pronounced the very defini-
tion of tyranny.”
47 Solutions to the problem of Type 2 corruption must not insulate public offi-
cials from the people, instead, solutions must provide public officials with incentives to take ac-
count of all the interests of the people, and to balance those interests in a way that passes 
muster at the ballot box. 
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This last observation raises the question of direct democracy. In a direct democracy, citizens 
themselves vote on matters currently decided by legislatures (or regulators). The outcome of 
such voting becomes law. Modern communication technology is making such a system techni-
cally feasible. One reason for the use of legislatures of elected representatives in the past was 
the practical impossibility of direct democracy for governments much larger than those of small 
New England towns, where all the voters could literally meet and debate the issues. Now that it 
is possible, should we exchange our current republic for a direct democracy? The obvious ad-
vantage: citizens could express their preferences directly even on obscure regulatory issues, 
eliminating the requirement that they rely on representatives who share only some but not all 
voter preferences.  
Communication costs aside, there are strong reasons to prefer representative government to 
direct democracy. Most citizens lack the time and resources to understand fully the range of 
issues currently considered by Congress or even state legislatures or city councils. In contrast, 
elected representatives typically are employed full time in making public policy. Members of 
Congress employ substantial personal expert staffs and have access to the work of even larger 
staffs employed by each Congressional committee. They can call on the Congressional Research 
Service of the Library of Congress, the General Accountability Office, and the Congressional 
Budget Office for analyses of issues related to legislation. They can call for hearings and listen to 
both interest groups and academic and other experts. Few individual citizens have comparable 
resources. Elected representatives therefore are in a position to be much better-informed 
about most issues than are typical citizens. Of course, that does not necessarily mean that rep-
resentatives will honor voter preferences, because of incentive incompatibility. 
Partly because of the lack of information available to individual citizens combined with lack of 
time and analytical training, direct voting is more likely to reflect emotional or instinctive reac-
tions than thoughtful cognitive processing of information. A large majority of direct votes on a 
given matter may be based on essentially random influences. There is no reason to expect the-
se votes to cancel each other. Humans share many common genetic and cultural endowments 37 
 
that produce a range of emotional or instinctive influences in decision making.
48 These biases 
are random only in the sense that they have no predictable relationship to the analytical issues 
presented for voting. It is the wording, context or framing of questions presented that, for ex-
ample, may produce predictable biases in instinctive responses, where “bias” refers to a sys-
tematic departure from rational decision-making. By definition, rational decision making pro-
motes the conscious objectives of the decision-maker. Irrational decisions are regretted by the 
decision-maker at a later time, when the decision can be considered dispassionately. Fear of 
making such an error is minimized in direct democracy, because each voter knows that a single 
vote is unlikely to affect the outcome. Thus, voters have little incentive to attempt avoidance of 
irrationality. Madison’s feared “passion” can run amuck. Of course, people also have little in-
centive to vote except when they are passionate. 
Voting for legislative representatives is to some extent a different matter. There still is little in-
centive to vote, especially to vote online. (Voting online or by mail deprives voters of the posi-
tive feedback that comes from encountering neighbors and friends at the polls, everyone exer-
cising their political entitlement and patriotic duty to participate.)  But the decision process re-
garding the choice of a representative typically is not seen as analytical in nature. Voting on a 
bond measure is quite different from voting for a Member of Congress or a mayor. Choosing a 
person is a matter of character evaluation, which we always do instinctively, seldom analytical-
ly. Are we better at picking people to trust than at analyzing issues? 
Another approach to pushing back the consequences of Type 2 corruption is what professor 
(now Justice) Elana Kagan has called “presidential administration.”
49 The idea is that instead of 
struggling to control the bureaucracy, the president supplants it by expanding the white house 
staff, especially around such starring roles as various “czars.”  This idea is a variant of “unitary 
executive” theories, in which the president seeks to exercise his constitutional power as chief 
executive simply by issuing orders on policy matters to administrative agencies, seizing the po-
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litical and media high ground on key issues.
50 As Congress is unlikely to accede passively to such 
a power shift (even if the president’s party controls both houses), an alliance with the judiciary 
appears to be a necessary strategic ingredient of presidential administration. However unlikely 
it may be, this sort of reform does seem to offer a path out of the Type 2 corruption mess, be-
cause the president and his party are subject to electoral discipline by the people.  
Lawrence Lessig, inventor of the phrase “Type 2 corruption,” in his recent book surveys a range 
of potential solutions, dismissing all of them as either ineffective or very unlikely to be imple-
mented.
 51 But of all these, Lessig himself favors convening a convention under Article V of the 
Constitution. Such a convention could be charged with fundamental reform of political cam-
paign financing, along with other, perhaps structural changes in the relationships among the 
three (or four) branches of government. Success in persuading a super-majority of states to pe-
tition Congress for a convention would require substantial time, energy, financial resources, 
inspired leadership and luck. 
A modest proposal 
I propose a new national elected office, the Inspector-General of the United States (IGUS). This 
perhaps requires a constitutional amendment. The inspector-general’s  mission will be akin to 
that of Congress’ General Accountability Office (GAO), headed by the Comptroller-General of 
the United States. GAO reports to Congress, and is part of the Legislative Branch. GAO’s mission 
is to audit the operations of executive branch and independent agencies, and to report on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of those agencies in carrying out their statutory goals. GAO does 
not audit legislation itself, or the performance of congressional committees.  
The Inspector-General of the United States would report to the people and would have respon-
sibility for identifying and publicizing (but not prosecuting) the most serious instances of Type 2 
corruption. The current inspectors general in each agency might be included in this organiza-
                                                      
50 Mark Tushnet, “A Political Perspective on the Theory of the Unitary Executive,” 12 JOURNAL OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 313-329 (2010). 
51 Lessig [page cite] . 39 
 
tion, but this detail is less important than the Inspector-General’s mission statement, which 
should focus on identifying the most significant welfare-reducing Type 2 corruption, as well as 
the most significant reductions in the welfare of the poorest.  
The premise for the creation of this new federal office is that there is no more effective way to 
protect the people of the United States from the adverse effects of Type 2 corruption on the 
economic welfare of the people, especially including the least well-off, or from the threat of 
Type 2 corruption to the national security of the United States.  
Empowerment of voters is the mechanism by which the mission is to be accomplished. The In-
spector-General will seek to identify, through investigation and analysis, the most important 
current cases of welfare loss and inequity stemming from Type 2 corruption, either in adminis-
trative regulations or in the details of enacted legislation. Having done so, the Inspector-
General will have the equally important responsibility to communicate this information effec-
tively to voters, identifying with particularity the Members of Congress, members of congres-
sional committees, and the officials and agencies of government (not limited to independent 
agencies) who are responsible for initiating, supporting, or voting for the provisions of law or 
regulation identified. Type 2 corruption will be identified by the Inspector-General on the basis 
of facially lawful direct or indirect political contributions to or expenditures on behalf of indi-
vidual Members of Congress, the president, or political parties. Information reported to the 
people will include the details of such contributions or support. 
The Inspector-General is to use the best available analytical methods and any necessary but 
reasonable assumptions in conducting studies of the welfare and equity effects of instances of 
Type 2 corruption. The Inspector-General should not be held to any particular standard of 
proof, but should indicate his or her degree of confidence in any quantitative estimate.  
The Inspector-General should have access to compulsory process, including access to classified 
material. In matters involving classified material the Inspector General need not report classi-
fied information to the public, but may describe in summary terms the estimated effects on 
welfare and the identities of responsible legislators, officials, and private parties. The Inspector-
General should not engage in criminal or civil litigation against any person, but may refer cases 40 
 
to the Department of Justice or congressional disciplinary committees as appropriate. The In-
spector-General is not directed to investigate matters involving Type 1 corruption or issues of 
high salience that have been widely debated in public fora, or had extensive media coverage, 
but may investigate non-salient details of such legislation or regulation. The Inspector-General 
should be selected by voters from among candidates meeting specific qualifications in periodic 
non-partisan contests coinciding with presidential elections.  
The impact of instances of Type 2 corruption on welfare and equity will be assessed with re-
spect to the alternative policies, laws or regulations most likely to prevail in the absence of the 
subject policy, law or regulation. The Inspector General’s reports will identify these alternatives. 
Except when direct and reliable measurement of effects on happiness are available, the Inspec-
tor General will use conventional economic measures of lost welfare, such as consumer willing-
ness to pay. Changes in surplus accruing to corporate entities will be attributed to their stock-
holders for purposes of assessing equity impacts of Type 2 corruption. The Inspector General is 
not charged to monitor or report on instances of income redistribution other than those that 
cause welfare losses or penalize the poorest citizens.  
The ability and desire of the people to absorb, process, and act on information is limited. The 
Inspector General will take account of these limitations by ensuring that reports to the public 
are accessible in various popular media formats and in a style that effectively communicates 
their content. The number of reports should not be excessive. The details of investigations and 
analyses supporting reports to the public should be available to any person online.  
These and many other details describing the functions of the Inspector General require much 
study and debate. In addition, given the small likelihood that this “modest proposal” will be 
adopted, it would be useful to consider private efforts and organizations that could perform a 
similar function.  
Conclusion 
Members of Congressional budget and oversight committees that deal with agencies have little 
incentive to promote public interest (welfare-enhancing) solutions to market failures within the 
jurisdictions of the agencies. The issues are seldom salient in Congressional elections. Instead, 41 
 
their incentives are to induce well-organized special interests to make contributions, in cash or 
in kind, to Members’ re-election campaigns, or to the parties. In return, Members support the 
interest groups’ positions on agency policies and regulations or at least grant access to the poli-
cy negotiating table. Typically there is no misalignment of incentives between the agencies and 
the committees. The agencies have no greater incentive to pursue welfare than the commit-
tees. The same interests (and often the same lobbyists) seek to influence the agency directly, 
with the tacit backing of the committees. Despite procedural safeguards, the agency, the com-
mittees, and the potent interest groups communicate frequently and informally to reach 
agreement on the details of regulatory policy. The special interests generally seek increased 
economic rents, some of which are created at the expense of consumers by policy actions that 
retard competition and innovation. Others do damage to the poorest among us. 
While this paper has been framed largely in terms of Type 2 corruption of the relationship be-
tween Congress and the administrative bureaucracy, most of its conclusions also apply to the 
non-salient details of complex legislation, such as tax and budget bills, especially legislation that 
issues regularly. For that reason, any solution must also address the legislative process. It is 
simply wishful thinking that power resides with the people on account of the elective status of 
legislators. No voter (indeed, no single person) can possibly be aware of the motivation and ef-
fects of tens of thousands of pages of new administrative regulations published each year, or 
the hundreds of new laws. The mass media focus on the sort of issues that sell newspapers and 
draw TV audiences, not the details in which the devil resides. 
Type 2 corruption is a built-in or systemic bias of the administrative state. Its significance grows 
as the jurisdiction of the regulatory state grows. Jurisdiction grows because regulatory legisla-
tion (including that which is merely prophylactic) grows, and administrative regulation satisfies 
a public demand for action in response to well-publicized, but often purely hypothetical dan-
gers. And it grows because the resulting regulatory institutions serve the private interest of 
Members in tapping into interest groups’ rents.   
The aggregate impact of Type 2 corruption’s policy bias on the economy is analogous to the 
steady growth of a parasitic organism in a biologic model. The model is less able to compete 42 
 
effectively for resources. This cannot continue indefinitely in an economy that faces global 
competition, and therefore it will not. Finding an effective solution is an urgent matter. A solu-
tion is required. Given the diagnosis of the problem, only two categories of solutions exist: 
campaign finance reform or empowerment of voters to consider Type 2 corruption in elections. 
One example of the latter category is to increase the accountability of Congress for the worst 
insults to welfare and equity by creating an elective office of the Inspector General charged 
with identifying the most consequential instances of Type 2 corruption, estimating the quanti-
tative impact of those instances, and bringing that information effectively to the attention of 
the electorate.  